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Introduction 
 
Atkinson (1998) identifies a concern with dynamics and multidimensionality as a key 
factor underlying the pervasive use of the terminology of social exclusion in the 
European Union (EU). This concern is also reflected in Berghman’s (1995) 
understanding of social exclusion as involving a social process in which the creation 
and reinforcement of inequalities leads to a state of deprivation and hardship from 
which it is difficult to escape. Paugam’s (1996) focus on spirals of precariousness also 
involves this joint emphasis. 
 
The notion of social exclusion, as De Haan (1998) observes, goes beyond a concern 
with current deprivation and focuses attention on vulnerability in the sense of 
exposure to insecurity and risk. It can also, as Chambers (1989) notes, incorporate 
people’s perceptions of their situation. One of our objectives is to operationalise the 
concept of individual economic vulnerability understood as ‘heightened risk of 
multidimensional deprivation’. This conception of social exclusion is narrower than 
those that build notions of social isolation or an undermining of social cohesion into 
their definitions.1 However, it is consistent with the fact that, as Kronauer (1998), 
notes, the development of the concept of social exclusion was directly related to the 
re-emergence of large scale unemployment and has no meaning outside of the history 
of the achievements of the welfare state. It presupposes a shared understanding of 
what it is to be included.2
 
More recently, globalisation has been seen as associated with increased but much 
more widely diffused levels of risk. This pattern is also thought to arise from the 
erosion of security deriving from traditional career patterns based on full-time 
employment over the life cycle. Intensified global competition and the overriding 
                                                     
1 For a comparison of alternative conceptions see Whelan and Maître (2005a). 
2 In fact despite the emphasis on social isolation in the literature the evidence connecting it to other 
aspects of social exclusion is extremely weak (Gallie et al 2003) 
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significance of competitiveness are thought to undermine the buffering capacity of the 
welfare state. The threat, if not the reality, of unemployment and resulting poverty are 
considered to have become more pervasive and to extend substantially beyond the 
working class (Beck, 1992, 2000 a & b, Castells, 2000).  Inequality and poverty rather 
than being differentially distributed between social classes vary between phases in the 
average work life. ‘Temporalisation and biographisation’ of poverty are seen to be 
features of the emergence of the ’the risk society’ in which relationship breakdowns 
and transitional crises are prevalent. Poverty is seen increasingly as both 
individualised and transitory and is ‘democratised’ (Leisering and Liebfried, 1999). 
The extension of employment insecurity and instability and potential poverty across 
the socio-economic spectrum involves  ‘capitalism without classes’ (Beck 1992: 88), 
and inequality of income becomes detached from its old moorings in class categories 
(Beck 2000a). 
 
In responding sceptically to the central claims of the latter thesis, recent critiques by 
Goldthorpe (2007a) and Atkinson (2007a) address a range of issues relating to the 
extent and consequences of flexibility and non-standard forms of work and their 
relationship to class position, the downward spiral of the capacity of welfare states to 
intervene, the scale and consequences of social mobility and reliance on caricatured 
versions of traditional class relationships.3 However, progress in resolving such 
disagreements is hampered by the absence, as Goldthorpe (2007a: 106) observes, of 
even a broad consensus on how those socially excluded/vulnerable/at risk are to be 
enumerated. In this paper we take advantage of the opportunity provided by the 
availability of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to go beyond 
analysis of income poverty dynamics and provide an assessment of the relationship 
between social class and persistent experience of ‘economic vulnerability’. In 
pursuing this objective, we combine features of recent approaches to explicit 
statistical modelling of poverty and deprivation dynamics4 and multidimensional 
social exclusion5.  
 
                                                     
3 See also the exchange between Atkinson (2007b) and Beck (2007). 
4 See Rendtel et al (1998), Breen and Moisio (2004), Moisio (2004) and Whelan and Maître (2006) 
5 De Wilde (2004), Moisio (2005) and Whelan and Maître (2005b). 
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In Section 2 we describe the ECHP data. Section 3 deals with the application of latent 
class models to cross-sectional data to identify those experiencing economic 
vulnerability. In Section 4 we consider previous studies modelling income poverty 
and deprivation dynamics. Section 5 extends our analysis to the formal modelling of 
economic vulnerability dynamics. In Section 6 we examine cross-national variation in 
economic vulnerability. Section 7 focuses on variation in economic vulnerability by 
social class. Finally, in Section 8 we draw our conclusions together. 
 
Data and Measures 
 
The results presented in this paper are based on the ECHP User Data Base (UDB) 
containing data from waves one to five (1994 to 1998).6 Our analysis of dynamics 
uses a balanced panel of survivors who remained in the sample from 1994 to 1998.  A 
focus on the first five waves enables us to avoid difficulties arising from sparse cell 
numbers and reduces problems arising from selective attrition.7 The data required for 
our analysis is available for only nine countries, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece. For these countries the total number of 
individual respondents in the first wave was 139,358 with 95,213 being available for 
analysis across the five waves from 1994–1998. 
 
Our income measure is the total annual equivalised household disposable income of 
the year prior to that in which data collection took place.8 Our analysis distinguishes 
four income categories; those below 50% of median income, those between 50% and 
60%, those between 60% and 70% and those above 70%.  Following standard 
procedures, the individual is chosen as the unit of analysis. 
 
Whelan et al (2001) identify thirteen household indicators of Current Life Style 
Deprivation. In each case the measures represent enforced absence of widely desired 
items. Full details are set out in Appendix A. The items include consumer durables 
such as a car, a video recorder and a dishwasher. This set of items has been shown to 
be that most closely related to the ECHP measure of equivalent household income.   
                                                     
6 For a discussion of the quality of the ECHP data see Wirz and Meyer (2002). 
7 Analyses of attrition in the ECHP by Watson (2003) and Behr et al  (2006) suggest that for the period 
we are concerned the type of attrition observed will not affect our conclusions. 
8 We use the modified OECD equivalence scale. 
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 An index based on a simple addition of these items gives a Cronbach alpha reliability 
coefficient of 0.80. We use a version of this measure in which each individual item is 
weighted by the proportion of households possessing that item in each country. The 
weights determine the importance of an item within a country and produce measures 
of relative deprivation within each country. 
 
In each country the cut off point for deprivation is aligned with that relating to the 
income poverty threshold in that country. The threshold is simply the level at which 
an identical percentage of individuals defined as income poor at the 70% of median 
household equivalent disposable are also deprived. If in Denmark we have identified 
18% of individuals as income poor at 70% of median income, the deprivation 
threshold is the CLSD score above which 18% of individuals are found. In principle, 
it is possible that the dichotomous income and deprivation measures could identify the 
same set of individuals and our findings are not influenced by the absolute numbers 
respectively poor and deprived. 
 
Economic vulnerability has generally been conceptualized not only in terms of 
objective risk of deprivation individuals’ but also subjective sense of insecurity. The 
measure of economic stress that we employ is based on the following question asked 
of all household reference persons in the ECHP: 
 
Thinking now of your household’s total income, from all sources and from all 
household members, would you say that your household is able to make ends meet? 
 
Respondents were offered six response categories ranging from ‘with great difficulty’ 
to ‘very easily’. The dichotomous subjective economic stress variable distinguishes as 
those reporting either ‘great difficulty’ or ‘difficulty’ from all others.  
 
Latent Class Analysis of Economic Vulnerability  
 
Our cross-sectional analysis is based on the set of 4x2x2 tables formed by cross-
classifying the four-category income variable, the dichotomous CLSD measure of 
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material deprivation and the dichotomous subjective economic stress variable. Our 
objective is to identify a group that is vulnerable to economic exclusion in the sense of 
being distinctive in their risk of falling below a critical resource level, exposure to 
deprivation and experience of economic stress. 
  
The underlying assumption of latent class analysis is that each individual is a member 
of one and only one such class and that, conditional on such membership, the manifest 
variables are mutually independent of each other. Given three variables the latent 
class model for variables A, B, C is 
 
XC
kt
XB
jt
XA
it
X
t
ABCX
ijkt πππππ =          (1) 
 
where  Xtπ denotes the probability of being in latent class t=1…T of latent variable X; 
XA
itπ denotes the conditional probability of obtaining the ith response to item A, from 
members of class  t, I=1…I; and XBjtπ , XCktπ denote the corresponding probabilities for 
items B and C respectively. 
 
The sample of countries available to us does not allow us to carry out a systematic 
statistical analysis in welfare regime terms. However, we can usefully structure our 
discussion in such terms. We have allocated countries to regimes as follows:  
 
Social-democratic: Denmark, The Netherlands. 
Corporatist: Belgium, France. 
Liberal: Ireland. 
Southern: Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece.9
 
The key features of different regimes can be delineated very briefly.10 The social 
democratic regime assigns the welfare state a substantial redistributive role, seeking to 
                                                     
9 This largely follows Ferrera (1996).  
 6
guarantee adequate economic resources independently of market or familial reliance. 
The corporatist regime views welfare primarily as a mediator of group-based mutual 
aid and risk pooling, with rights to benefits depending on being already inserted in the 
labour market. The liberal regime acknowledges the primacy of the market and 
confines the state to a residual welfare role, social benefits typically being subject to a 
means test and targeted on those failing in the market. The Southern countries 
constitute a distinctive welfare regime with family support systems playing a crucial 
role and the benefit system being uneven and minimalist in nature.11  
 
We anticipate that variation in levels of inequality between regimes and differences in 
extent of regulation of the labour market, and the associated insider-outsider divisions, 
within and between regimes will influence levels of economic vulnerability. Gallie 
and Paugam (2000:353) concluded that ‘high-security’ employment centred systems 
within the corporatist group were highly successful in providing financial protection.  
We expect to observe generally high levels of economic vulnerability in Southern 
regime countries. However, rigid labour markets in Spain and Italy involving sharp 
insider-outsider divisions which operate particularly to the disadvantage of younger 
workers, combined with high levels of intergenerational co-residence, are likely to 
differentiate these countries from Portugal and Greece. Since our key variables are 
measured at the household level, disadvantaged younger people within such 
households will not be identified as vulnerable. 12 This is likely to be especially true in 
Italy where labour market regulation is particularly associated with difficulty in 
entering employment rather than the Spanish case where insecurity of employment is 
a stronger feature.13  
 
Table I sets out the fit statistics for a two-class latent class model of economic 
vulnerability for all five waves of the ECHP for each of the nine countries included in 
our analysis. Given the large sample sizes ranging from 21,424 in wave one in Italy to 
5,272 in Denmark in wave 5, any highly parsimonious model is unlikely to fit 
according to conventional statistical criteria. Nevertheless it does well across all nine 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 See the extended discussions in, for example, Esping-Andersen (1990), Goodin et al. (1999) and 
Bison and Esping-Andersen (2000). 
11 See Ferrera, (1996); Bonoli, (1997); Arts and Gelissen, (2002) 
12  See Gallie and Paugam (2000: 13-18), Iacovou (2004). 
13 See Tohara and Malo (2000) and Ianelli and Soro-Bonamatí (2003) 
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countries and five observation points in accounting for the patterns of association 
between the three indicators.  The G2 goodness of fit statistic ranges from 7.7 in wave 
1 in Denmark to 107.0 in wave 2 in Italy with 10 degrees of freedom. Focusing on ∆ - 
the proportion of cases misclassified- we find that the level of misclassification ranges 
from 0.002 in the Netherlands in wave 4 to 0.019 in Ireland in wave 5. No systematic 
tendency for goodness of fit to vary across waves is observed. The indices of fit for 
the independence model provide a benchmark for strength of the association between 
the indicators that requires explanation. The latent class model, which uses six 
additional degrees of freedom, reduces the independence G2 by at least 98 % in 44 of 
the 45 cases. While some improvement in statistical fit could be achieved by 
increasing the number of classes it would be on a very modest scale.  
 
Table I: Fit Statistics for Cross-sectional Economic Vulnerability Two Class Latent Class 
Models 
  
1994 
 
1995 1996 1997 
 
1998
  G2 ∆ G2 ∆ G2 ∆ G2 ∆ G2 ∆ 
Denmark 7.66 0.004 41.69 0.009 17.2 0.007 13.25 0.006 24.77 0.007
Netherlands 15.73 0.005 19.92 0.006 8.00 0.004 6.13 0.002 9.00 0.003
Belgium 42.11 0.009 5.65 0.005 31.53 0.007 24.95 0.008 12.82 0.005
France 13.89 0.004 24.56 0.007 10.38 0.004 41.08 0.009 31.03 0.007
Ireland 30.18 0.008 23.91 0.008 37.7 0.012 33.05 0.011 73.34 0.019
Italy 41.70 0.010 107.03 0.017 74.43 0.014 51.72 0.011 85.54 0.014
Spain 71.03 0.014 75.96 0.012 64.22 0.014 92.18 0.016 68.23 0.012
Portugal 64.17 0.012 69.89 0.015 94.12 0.018 17.97 0.006 8.95 0.006
Greece 38.16 0.012 12.36 0.005 47.33 0.011 58.56 0.016 42.11 0.015
 
 
In Table II we set out details of the size of the economically vulnerable class for each 
country for all waves. Focusing on the first wave, we find that the lowest levels of 
economic vulnerability ranging between 18% and 24% are observed in the social 
democratic and corporatist countries. The higher level in Denmark rather than the 
Netherlands is in line with our knowledge of the degree of labour market flexibility in 
the former. Similarly, the higher level in France rather than Belgium is consistent with 
the operation of a ‘high-security’ employment centred system in the latter. As we 
would expect, the Irish level of 32% is substantially higher. The average level of 
vulnerability in the Southern regime countries is similar to the Irish outcome but there 
is considerable internal variation with the rate varying from a low of 25% in Italy to 
38% in Greece. Thus, the mean level is in line with between regime variations in 
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inequality while the lower levels characterising Spain, and Italy, are consistent with 
the dualistic patterns of labour market regulation in those societies and the interaction 
of such regulation with of family support systems. 
 
Little systematic variation is observed across time. The one exception relates to 
Ireland where there is a steady decline in the level of vulnerability from 32% in wave 
1 to 23% in wave 5. This finding is entirely consistent with the exceptional economic 
changes affecting the country during that period with the level of unemployment 
declining from 15% in 1994 to 8% in 1998. For the remaining countries, the largest 
percentage difference between the first and the fifth waves is 3% and the overall 
average involves a reduction of 2%. Such variation clearly plays a minor role in 
structuring vulnerability dynamics. 
 
Table II: Estimated Levels of Economic Vulnerability in ECHP Waves 1 to 5 by 
Country 
Economic Vulnerability Rates ( per cent) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Denmark 21.1 21.9 26.3 17.4 21.4 
Netherlands 17.5 17.4 16.3 15.5 15.2 
Belgium 18.7 19.2 22.2 21.6 19.2 
France 24.3 24.7 24.6 22.3 21.0 
Ireland 31.6 30.8 28.0 26.2 22.6 
Italy 24.9 23.7 23.6 21.6 26.0 
Spain 29.6 27.8 28.3 29.9 29.4 
Portugal 32.5 29.5 31.4 29.2 29.2 
Greece 37.8 38.2 40.5 41.7 38.2 
 
 
The general distribution of level of economic vulnerability across countries is 
consistent with our expectations. In Table III we document the manner in which the 
economically vulnerable class is distinguished from the remainder of the population in 
terms of the probabilities, conditional on membership or non-membership of the 
economically vulnerable class, of relative income poverty, being above the 
deprivation threshold and reporting subjective economic stress. Variation across 
waves in such multidimensional differentiation is modest.  
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The key differentiating variable is the risk of being above the deprivation threshold. 
The non-vulnerable are largely insulated from such risk with the observed conditional 
probabilities ranging from zero to 0.10.  For the vulnerable class the risk level does 
not fall below 0.74 and peaks at 0.94. A distinctive, but somewhat less sharp pattern 
of differentiation, is observed in relation to subjective economic stress. Membership 
of the vulnerable class was associated with a probability exceeding 0.60 of reporting 
such stress in seven of the nine countries; being highest in the liberal and Southern 
welfare regimes. For the non-economically vulnerable the conditional probability did 
not exceed 0.06 in five of the nine countries or 0.21 in eight out of nine of the 
observations. In every case a substantial differential was observed between the 
vulnerable and the non-vulnerable classes but a clear tendency towards higher levels 
of stress among the non-vulnerable in the Southern regime countries was reflected in 
narrower within country differentials. For income poverty levels, a relatively uniform 
but much less sharp pattern of differentiation was observed. For convenience we have 
reported the conditional probabilities of being below respectively the 70%, 60% and 
50% relative income poverty lines. Perhaps reflecting the impact of active labour 
market policies, distinctively low levels of income poverty are observed for the 
economically vulnerable in Denmark. For the remaining eight countries the 
conditional probability of being below the 70% median income poverty line ranges 
from 0.57 to 0.66. For the non-vulnerable the risk level across all nine countries runs 
from 0.12 to 0.18.  At the 60% line the corresponding figures for the vulnerable run 
from 0.36 to 0.52 and for the non-vulnerable from 0.04 to 0.11. Finally at the 50% 
line the respective ranges go from 0.13 to 0.38 and 0.02 to 0.08. Thus, while 
economic vulnerability is clearly characterised by heightened probability of income 
poverty, the primary differentiating factor is material deprivation followed by 
experience of subjective economic stress.14
 
 
                                                     
14 For further details see Whelan and Maître (2005b). 
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Table III: Probabilities of Being Income Poor, Deprived and Experiencing Economic Stress Conditional on 
Membership of the Economically Vulnerable (EV) Class and the Non Economically (NEV) Class 
 
         DK   NL   BE   FR IE IT EL ES PT 
Class Type NEV EV  NEV EV NEV EV NEV EV NEV EV NEV EV NEV EV NEV EV NEV EV 
                   
e                   
 
 
 
               
 
               
 
Incom
<70% 0.14 0.33 0.12 0.61 0.18 0.57 0.14 0.59 0.12 0.58 0.15 0.66 0.14 0.57 0.13 0.59 0.16 0.57
<60% 0.08 0.18 0.04 0.36 0.11 0.42 0.08 0.42 0.06 0.41 0.10 0.52 0.09 0.46 0.08 0.46 0.11 0.47
<50%
 
0.04 0.07
 
 0.02
 
 0.20 0.06 0.25 0.05 0.26 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.38 
 
0.06 0.36 0.05 0.31 0.08 0.36
Deprivation
 
0.00 0.87
 
 0.05
 
 0.94 0.10 0.92 0.06 0.81 0.03 0.76 0.10 0.81 
 
0.05 0.74 0.07 0.75 0.06 0.81
Economic 
Stress 0.06 0.43 0.02 0.65 0.03 0.56 0.05 0.64 0.13 0.70 0.05 0.70 0.31 0.94 0.20 0.81 0.21 0.73
 
 
 
 
 
 In order to conduct the dynamic analysis that follows individuals are allocated to a 
latent class on the basis of the modal assignment rule with each observation in a cell 
being assigned to the class with the largest conditional probability.15 The estimated 
classification error employing this procedure ranges from 3.2% in Denmark in wave 1 
to 12.3% in Greece in wave 5. It exceeds 10% for only four of our 45 observations 
and shows modest variation across waves. The proportionate improvement over an 
approach that assigns all observations to the largest latent class ranges from 0.85 in 
Denmark in wave 1 to 0.62 in Spain in wave 5.16 .  
 
Modelling Income Poverty and Deprivation Dynamics 
 
Descriptive accounts of income poverty dynamics provide a consistent picture. High 
mobility is observed into and out of poverty. Far fewer people live in persistent 
poverty than are poor at any given time and a much larger part of the population 
experiences poverty at some point in time than cross-sectional figures suggest.  On the 
other hand, incidence of poverty tends to be concentrated in the same section of the 
population.17 However, as Breen and Moisio (2004) stress, such accounts lack 
parsimony in that they imply a saturated structural model, and do not take 
measurement error into account.  
 
Breen and Moisio (2004) and Moisio (2004) addressed these issue by combining 
structural models of the underlying dynamics and measurement error models. The 
former ranged in complexity from a simple Markov model to a time-heterogeneous 
mover-stayer model that allows for error in measurement of the movers’ states. The 
simple Markov chain model assumes that the state occupied at time t depends only on 
                                                     
15 Thus, suppose there are three observed categorical variables A, B, and C, the conditional probability 
that someone belongs to latent class t given that this person is at level i of A, level j of B, and level k of 
C is given by the following expression: ∑ = ππππ
ππππ=π
T
1t
X\C
kt
X\B
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X\A
it
X
t
X\C
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X\B
jt
X\A
it
X
tABC\X
tijk  
The percentage of cases misclassified is calculated as: 100x ( )[ ]∑ ⋅π−j jj Nnˆ1  where  is the 
number of respondents giving response pattern j,  is the estimated modal latent class probability 
jn
jπˆ
given response pattern j, and N is the total sample size. As Chan and Goldthorpe (2007: 16) note the 
percentage of cases misclassified by latent class models should be understood in terms of measurement 
error and not as a measure of goodness of fit. 
16 See Mc Cutcheon (1987: 36–37) for a discussion of these indices. 
17  Breen and Moisio (2004), Whelan et al (2004) and Whelan and Maitre (2006) for details. 
that occupied at time t-1. A mixed Markov model allows for more than one chain. The 
best known of such models is a mover-stayer where the transition probabilities in the 
second chain relating to the stayers are assumed to be either one or zero. The model 
assumes two underlying groups – one stable between successive years and another 
involving individuals who move in and out of income poverty according to a simple 
Markov change process. The final structural model applied by Breen and Moisio 
(2004) is a mover-stayer model in which the movers’ chain is allowed to be 
heterogeneous over time. The model is specified as follows 
 
        (2) lms
s
s
klsjksijssisijklm NF |,
1
|,|,|, ττττδπ∑
=
=
 
This specifies several Markov processes or chains (indicated by s=1,...,S). The 
expected frequency is now a sum over these processes, and the new parameter, sπ , 
indicates the proportions of the sample in each of the S chains. The simple Markov 
model arises when S=1, but for S >1 the membership of the different chains is defined 
by latent classes. Another important special case of this model arises when S=2 and, 
for one of the processes, 1| =ijτ if state j = state i, 0 otherwise, and similarly for all the 
other transition probabilities. This is the classic mover-stayer model that specifies that 
there are two non-mover groups, one never in poverty and one always in poverty and 
an additional group of movers whose pattern of transitions follow a simple Markov 
chain in which the state occupied at time t depends only on the state occupied at time 
t-1. The time heterogeneous version allows the poverty transition probabilities of the 
mover group to vary over time.  
 
Measurement error is captured by assuming that to each observation of the states there 
corresponds a latent variable that measures the true distribution over the state. Stayers 
are assumed to be measured without error. Reliabilities for the movers are constrained 
to be constant over time. The model is written as  
 
emedldckcbjb
A
a
B
b
C
c
D
d
aia
E
e
ijklm NF ||||
1 1 1 1
|
1
ρδρδρδρδρδ∑∑∑∑∑
= = = = =
=      (3) 
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The latent variables are denoted a=1,...,A, b=1,...,B, c=1,...,C, d=1,…,D and e=1,…E. 
The distribution of each latent variable is given by δ and the relationship between the 
observed variables I, J, K,L and M and their latent counterparts, A, B, C,D and E is 
described by the conditional response probabilities ρ . The closer the response 
probability matrix is to an identity matrix (i.e. latentmanifest |ρ =1 when the latent and 
manifest states are the same, 0 otherwise) the smaller is the measurement error of the 
variable. These ρ parameters can thus be interpreted as measures of reliability. 
 
Finally this measurement model can be combined with the time heterogeneous mover-
stayer model. The final model is specified as  
 
emsdlscksbjsaisdescdsbcsabssa
B
b
s
C
c
D
d
E
e
A
a
S
s
ijklm NF |,|,|,|,|,|,|,|,|,
1 1 1 111
ρρρρρττττδπ∑∑∑∑∑∑
= = = ===
=       (4) 
 
This final model allows us to simultaneously estimate the structural and measurement 
components of the partially heterogeneous mover–stayer model that constrains 
reliabilities to be constant across time.  Applying this model to ECHP data, Breen and 
Moisio (2004) concluded that mobility in poverty dynamics was overestimated by 
between 25 % and 50 %.  
 
Modelling Economic Vulnerability 
 
In Table IV we display the fit statistics for the application of the above model to the 
five waves of data deriving from the modal allocation of individuals to the vulnerable 
or non-vulnerable classes. While the models do not provide a strict statistical fit, they 
account for between 98.1 % and 99.2% of the independence model deviance with the 
G2 ranging between 55.0 for Belgium and 413.9 for Spain. The proportion of cases 
misclassified varies between 0.019 for Belgium and 0.044 cent for Spain. The 
comparable range for earlier analysis by Whelan and Maître (2006:314) was 0.017 to 
0.030 for income poverty and 0.012 to 0.038 for deprivation. Thus our preferred 
model provides a broadly satisfactory account of the dynamics of economic 
vulnerability.  
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Table IV: Fit Statistics for the time-heterogeneous mover-stayer model and 
percentage reduction in G2 from the independence model 
    
 G2 ∆ r G2
Denmark 75.0 0.022 99.2 
Netherlands 164.9 0.022 98.7 
Belgium 55.0 0.019 99.2 
France 294.2 0.034 98.5 
Ireland 178.7 0.031 98.6 
Italy 383.5 0.033 98.4 
Spain 413.9 0.044 98.1 
Portugal 337.2 0.041 98.7 
Greece 276.4 0.043 98.6 
 
In Table V we display cross-national variation in the reliability rates for movers. The 
modal response probabilities in the diagonals provide separate estimates of reliability 
for the vulnerable and non-vulnerable classes. Earlier findings showed a pronounced 
asymmetrical reliability pattern whereby errors levels were much higher for the poor 
leading to substantial overestimates of poverty mobility exits. This asymmetry was 
even more pronounced in relation to deprivation. While the pattern of reliability for 
economic vulnerability is also asymmetrical, in six out of the nine cases the difference 
is negligible and the lowest level of reliability for the vulnerable class is 0.84. The 
average level of reliability for vulnerability is 0.91 and for non-vulnerability 0.95.  
 
Table V: Reliability Rates for Movers by Country 
  Observed 
  Not Vulnerable Vulnerable 
 Latent   
Denmark    
 Not Vulnerable 1.00 0.00 
 Vulnerable 0.01 0.99 
Netherlands    
 Not Vulnerable 0.96 0.04 
 Vulnerable 0.06 0.94 
Belgium    
 Not Vulnerable 0.93 0.07 
 Vulnerable 0.11 0.89 
France    
 Not Vulnerable 0.95 0.05 
 Vulnerable 0.14 0.86 
Ireland    
 Not Vulnerable 0.93 0.07 
 Vulnerable 0.09 0.91 
Italy    
 Not Vulnerable 0.93 0.07 
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 Vulnerable 0.09 0.91 
Spain    
 Not Vulnerable 0.94 0.06 
 Vulnerable 0.16 0.84 
Portugal    
 Not Vulnerable 0.96 0.04 
 Vulnerable 0.10 0.90 
Greece    
 Not Vulnerable 0.96 0.04 
 Vulnerable 0.05 0.95 
Average    
 Not Vulnerable 0.95 0.05 
 Vulnerable 0.09 0.91 
 
 
 
In Table VI we set out the size of the mover/stayer classes and the proportions 
economically vulnerable in wave 1. The degree of variation is substantially sharper 
than in the case of income poverty.18 The highest proportion of stayers is observed in 
the Netherlands and Belgium where approximately three in four fall into this category. 
This figure falls to close to six out of ten for Denmark, France and Ireland before 
declining further to one in two for Italy, Spain and Portugal. Finally the lowest level 
of four out of ten is observed for Greece. 
 
From Column 4 of Table VI we see the proportion vulnerable in the first wave is in 
every case substantially higher for movers. The relevant figure ranges from a low of 
0.30 in Denmark to a high of 0.57 for Portugal. With the exception of Ireland, the 
figure for the Northern European countries lies in the narrow range running from 0.30 
to 0.37. Ireland in contrast displays a much higher rate of 0.47. Countries with the 
highest levels of movers also exhibit the highest probability of being vulnerable, 
conditional on being a mover. Substantially higher levels of vulnerability among their 
mover segments, which are almost three times higher than for any other country, also 
contribute significantly to the distinctively higher overall levels of vulnerability in 
Greece and Portugal.  In order to illustrate the combined impact of such effects in the 
section that follows we consider cross-national variation in economic vulnerability 
profiles. 
 
                                                     
18 See Whelan and Maître (2006) 
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Table VI: Class size of movers/stayers and initial proportion economically vulnerable 
by country 
  Class Size Proportion 
Vulnerable in 
Wave 1 
Denmark    
 Mover 0.40 0.30 
 Stayer 0.60  0.08 
Netherlands    
 Mover 0.24 0.37 
 Stayer 0.76  0.05 
Belgium    
 Mover 0.28 0.37 
 Stayer 0.72  0.07 
France    
 Mover 0.37 0.33 
 Stayer 0.63  0.10 
Ireland    
 Mover 0.41 0.47 
 Stayer 0.59  0.11 
Italy    
 Mover 0.48 0.38 
 Stayer 0.52  0.08 
Spain    
 Mover 0.51 0.48 
 Stayer 0.49 0.12 
Portugal    
 Mover 0.49 0.57 
 Stayer 0.51  0.28 
    
Greece    
 Mover 0.58 0.44 
 Stayer 0.42  0.28 
    
Average    
 Mover 0.42 0.41 
 Stayer 0.59 0.13 
 
Cross-national Variation in Latent Economic Vulnerability Persistence  
 
We follow Fouarge and Layte (2005) in constructing profiles that allow us to examine 
both the persistence and recurrence of latent economic vulnerability by distinguishing 
between: 
• The persistently non-vulnerable – never vulnerable during the transient period 
• The transient vulnerable – vulnerable only once during the accounting period. 
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• The recurrent vulnerable – vulnerable more than once but never longer than 
two consecutive years. 
• The persistently vulnerable  – for a consecutive period of at least three years. 
 
From Table VII we can see that overall over 60% of individuals are found in the 
persistently non-vulnerable category; 10 % are equally divided between the transient 
and recurrent categories and 19% are found in the persistently vulnerable group. 
Compared to earlier findings relating to income poverty and deprivation, this involves 
a greater concentration of observations in the intermediate categories with 
corresponding lower levels of both types of persistence. For social democratic and 
corporatist countries it is the number persistently vulnerable that is lower than in the 
income poverty case. In contrast, for the Southern regime countries it is the number 
persistently non-vulnerable that is lower. The foregoing pattern produces sharper 
contrasts between countries than in the case of income poverty. 
Table VII:  Latent Vulnerability Profiles by Country 
 Persistently 
Non-
Vulnerable 
Transient Recurrent Persistently 
Vulnerable 
Denmark 65.9 10.9 11.3 11.9 
Netherlands 76.6 6.5 6.1 10.8 
Belgium 75.1 6.0 6.7 12.2 
France 66.5 9.5 7.2 16.9 
Ireland 60.2 9.5 8.7 21.5 
Italy 66.2 7.9 9.5 16.3 
Spain 56.6 8.2 11.8 23.5 
Portugal 50.9 11.3 10.2 27.6 
Greece 45.4 13.8 14.7 26.2 
Average 62.6 9.3 9.6 18.5 
 
The Netherlands and Belgium display by far the highest levels of persistent non-
vulnerability with three quarters of respondents falling into this category; while 11 to 
12% are found in the persistently vulnerable category. While Denmark has a lower 
level of persistent non-vulnerability it differs from the Netherlands and Belgium only 
in being almost twice as likely to be found in the transient and recurrent categories; a 
finding that is consistent with its active labour market policies.  The social democratic 
welfare countries and the corporatist case closest to a “high-security” employment 
centered system display the lowest levels of economic vulnerability. In France, Italy 
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and Ireland approximately two-thirds of the respondents are located in the persistently 
non-vulnerable category. However, the levels of persistent vulnerability are somewhat 
higher than for all of the foregoing countries with rates of respectively 17, 16 and 
22%. In the Spanish case a lower level of persistent non-vulnerability and a 
corresponding increase in the level of persistent vulnerability is observed; the 
respective figures being 57% and 24%. However, a less potent version of the factors 
operating in the Italian case contributes to maintaining a clear differentiation between 
it and the Portuguese and Greek cases. For the latter cases, the level of persistent non-
vulnerability declines to 51% and 46%, respectively, and the scale of persistent 
vulnerability increases to 28% and 26%. These findings are broadly in line with the 
expectations we outlined earlier on the basis of the welfare and employment regimes 
literature.  
 
A summary picture of cross-national variation in economic vulnerability and income 
poverty is provided in Table VIII where we display the odds ratios for persistent non-
poverty and persistent non-vulnerability with the Netherlands as the reference 
category. For income poverty the range of odds ratios runs from 0.73 in Denmark to 
2.65 in Spain. For economic vulnerability, rather than Denmark being the country 
most insulated from risk, it is the Netherlands followed by Belgium. The change 
arises because the numbers in the transient and recurrent categories in Denmark are 
significantly higher than for income poverty.  Thus while Danish active labour market 
problems are particularly successful in preventing income poverty persistence, they 
are somewhat less effective in comparison with the Netherlands and Belgium in 
ensuring that individuals are insulated from more broadly defined economic 
vulnerability. The contrast between the latter countries and the reminder is sharper 
than in the case of income poverty with the value of the odds ratio varying from 1.00 
in the Netherlands to 3.94 in Greece. Three clusters of values emerge with the 
Netherlands and Belgium at the low end of the continuum, Denmark (because of the 
high numbers in transient and recurrent categories), France, Italy and Ireland 
occupying an intermediate position with values ranging between 1.65 and 2.16 and 
Spain, Portugal and Greece at the opposite end of the continuum with respective 
values of 2.51, 3.16 and 3.94.  
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Table VIII: Cross-National Comparisons of being Persistently Non-Income Poor and 
Persistently Non Economically Vulnerable for Latent Outcomes with the Netherlands 
as the Reference Category  
 Odds Ratios 
 Income Poverty  Economic Vulnerability 
Netherlands 1.00 1.00 
Denmark 0.73 1.69 
Belgium 1.41 1.09 
France 1.27 1.65 
Ireland 1.88 2.16 
Italy 1.52 1.67 
Spain 2.65 2.51 
Portugal 2.33 3.16 
Greece 2.37 3.94 
 
The Distribution of Economic Vulnerability by Social Class 
 
In analyzing the relationship between social class position and economic 
vulnerability, we make use of an aggregated version of the European Socio-economic 
Classification (ESeC). The schema following Goldthorpe (2007b) is based on an 
understanding of forms of employment relationship as viable responses to the weaker 
or stronger presence of monitoring and asset specificity problems in different work 
situations.19 As Goldthorpe (2002:213), observes, one of the primary objectives of 
schemas such as of ESeC is to bring out the constraints and opportunities typical of 
different class positions particularly as they bear “on individuals security, stability 
and prospects as a precondition of constructing explanations of empirical 
regularities”. The latent profile of economic vulnerability provides a particularly 
appropriate outcome indicator in examining the impact of social class defined in this 
manner. 
 
We are not in a position to examine trends over time in the impact of social class. 
However, by using an outcome measure that captures both multidimensional and 
dynamic aspects and by providing cross-national comparison we hope to add to the 
evidence base in an area that, as Goldthorpe (2007b) notes, has been characterized by 
a discrepancy between the strength of the claims made and the degree of systematic 
investigation. Clearly a failure to observe systematic variation by social class in 
                                                     
19 See Rose and Harrison (2007) for a detailed discussion of the rationale underlying the development 
of ESeC and details of the operationalisation procedures. 
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exposure to persistent economic vulnerability would seriously undermine claims for 
the continuing importance of class based explanations of variation in life-chances.   
 
Our analysis employs a six-category aggregated version of the ESeC. For our present 
purposes, we assign the social class of the household reference person to all 
household members. Where a couple are jointly responsible for the accommodation 
we use a dominance procedure to decide between them.  
 
The six classes with which we operate are  
• Employers, higher grade professional, administrative & managerial 
occupations (ESeC Classe 1 & 2). 
• Intermediate occupations  - Higher grade white collar workers (ESeC Class 3). 
• Lower supervisory & lower technician occupations (ESeC Class 6). 
• Small employer and self employed occupations (ESeC Classes 4 & 5). 
• Lower services, sales & clerical occupations & lower technical occupations 
(ESeC Classes 7 &8). 
• Routine occupations (ESeC Class 9).20 
 
From Table IX it is clear that, notwithstanding arguments relating to the 
diversification of risk, in every country, location in the professional managerial class 
proves to be an enormously effective buffer against economic vulnerability. The 
number persistently non-vulnerable ranges from a high of 89% in the Netherlands and 
Spain to a low of 77% in Denmark. Variation in levels of persistent vulnerability is 
even more modest with the relevant figure going from 3% in Spain to 7% in Ireland. 
Thus any decline in the favoured position of the professional- managerial class can 
only have been from an extremely elevated starting positions.  
 
Those in intermediate occupations occupy the next most favourable position with the 
numbers persistently non- vulnerable ranging from 82% in the Netherlands to 61% in 
Denmark with the corresponding figures for persistent vulnerability running from 6% 
                                                     
20 Those who could not be allocated a class position on the basis of their current or previous occupation 
of the household reference person were excluded from the analysis. 
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in Spain to 18% in Denmark. Levels for the self –employed vary substantially across 
country while their relative position is in each case inferior to the higher white-collar 
groups and close to that of the lower supervisory/technician/services category. Levels 
of persistent non-vulnerability vary from 69% in Belgium to 33% in Greece for the 
self–employed and for the lower supervisory group from 75% in Belgium to 51% in 
Greece. While a broadly similar pattern of relativities is observed in relation to 
persistent vulnerability, the relative position of the self-employed is much less 
favourable in France, Portugal and Greece while in Ireland the opposite is the case. 
 
Substantial variation across countries is also observed for the lower services/technical 
class and for routine occupations. For the former the level of persistent non-
vulnerability ranges from 71% in Belgium to 32% in Greece and for persistent 
vulnerability from 13% in Denmark to 39% in Portugal. Unlike the case for the higher 
social classes, the levels vary fairly systematically across welfare regimes. A similar 
pattern is observed for the routine occupation where the level of persistent non-
vulnerability runs from 64% in Belgium to 30% in Greece and the scale of persistent 
vulnerability from 19% in the Netherlands to 40 % in Spain. 
 
Thus in all countries patterns of persistent economic vulnerability vary across social 
classes in a manner largely consistent with the expectations of advocates of the 
continuing relevance of class analysis. Variations in class differences across countries 
are extremely modest for the most favoured social classes but become substantially 
sharper in the lower reaches of the class structure. 
Table IX:  Economic vulnerability profile by ESeC by Country 
  
Large 
emp, Hi 
prof        
+ lo 
prof 
Intermediate 
occupations 
Small 
emp & 
self 
emp. 
(inc. ag)
Lo 
supervis/    
technician 
Lo 
services   
+  Lo 
technical 
Routine 
occupations
Denmark       
Persistent non-EV 77.2 60.5 60.3 70.2 54.1 44.6 
Transient EV 8.5 13.6 12.7 8.1 16.3 11.8 
Recurrent EV 8.2 8.3 12.9 10.1 16.8 23.0 
Persistent EV 6.1 17.6 14.0 11.6 12.8 20.6 
       
Netherlands       
Persistent non-EV 89.0 81.9 65.0 74.3 66.1 60.7 
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Transient EV 4.2 6.9 6.8 10.9 7.5 10.0 
Recurrent EV 3.5 4.2 6.0 7.3 9.8 10.2 
Persistent EV 3.2 7.0 22.1 7.4 16.5 19.0 
       
Belgium       
Persistent non-EV 83.4 74.8 68.6 75.1 70.5 64.2 
Transient EV 5.1 4.1 6.8 7.8 7.6 7.8 
Recurrent EV 4.8 6.1 10.2 6.6 8.1 8.0 
Persistent EV 6.7 15.0 14.4 10.5 13.8 20.0 
       
France       
Persistent non-EV 84.9 69.2 56.5 64.2 48.5 42.7 
Transient EV 6.5 11.1 11.1 8.9 11.2 11.2 
Recurrent EV 3.7 6.6 9.5 7.4 10.8 11.2 
Persistent EV 5.0 13.0 22.9 19.4 29.5 34.8 
       
Ireland       
Persistent non-EV 84.4 71.6 63.6 59.6 46.6 38.6 
Transient EV 5.9 8.9 15.1 5.1 11.5 10.7 
Recurrent EV 2.9 8.6 9.6 7.5 11.5 13.5 
Persistent EV 6.8 10.9 11.8 27.7 30.5 37.2 
       
Italy       
Persistent non-EV 85.8 72.3 63.8 62.9 53.5 51.3 
Transient EV 4.8 7.3 9.1 9.2 8.7 10.1 
Recurrent EV 5.0 9.0 10.9 10.4 9.9 14.4 
Persistent EV 4.4 11.5 16.2 17.6 27.9 24.3 
       
Spain       
Persistent non-EV 89.3 78.0 50.4 57.2 41.4 34.3 
Transient EV 4.5 7.7 9.4 10.6 8.1 9.6 
Recurrent EV 3.3 8.3 14.2 10.4 15.9 16.5 
Persistent EV 2.9 6.0 26.0 21.8 34.5 39.7 
       
Portugal       
Persistent non-EV 86.5 77.8 48.1 55.0 35.6 34.4 
Transient EV 5.6 7.2 11.5 13.3 13.6 13.4 
Recurrent EV 4.4 4.6 9.9 12.8 11.7 17.1 
Persistent EV 3.4 10.4 30.5 18.9 39.0 35.1 
       
Greece       
Persistent non-EV 83.2 61.7 33.2 50.6 32.2 30.0 
Transient EV 8.6 17.6 14.7 20.4 15.8 12.9 
Recurrent EV 4.3 12.4 17.4 15.2 18.9 18.6 
Persistent EV 3.9 8.2 34.8 13.8 33.1 38.5 
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Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have sought to implement an approach to social exclusion that 
captures both multidimensional and dynamics aspects of social exclusion. Such 
vulnerability varies across welfare regimes in a manner broadly consistent with our 
expectations. Variation in vulnerability levels across waves was extremely modest.  
 
Descriptive accounts of the dynamics of income poverty and deprivation involve 
significant overestimation of the level of exits from such states. Our analysis of 
economic vulnerability dynamics shows that problems associated with measurement 
error are substantially less in this latter case.  The size of the stayer class varied across 
welfare regimes broadly in line with our expectations. Vulnerability rates in wave one 
for both movers and stayers were higher for both liberal and Southern welfare 
regimes. Consequently levels of persistent vulnerability varied systematically by 
welfare regime; with a degree of internal variation that was consistent with the 
influence of insider-outsider labour market arrangements and the mediating role of 
family support systems.  
 
Sociological interest in vulnerability has been associated with the argument that one 
of the consequences of globalization has been that exposure to risk has become more 
pervasive and less structured in class terms. While we are not in a position to examine 
trends over time in class effects, the fact that in every country the higher social classes 
enjoy very high levels of protection from persistent economic vulnerability argues 
against the emergence of a more pervasive distribution of risk. Systematic variation in 
vulnerability levels was observed across countries and social classes. However, the 
latter was concentrated among classes at the lower end of the hierarchy; indicating 
strict limits to cross-national convergence in risk levels associated with globalization. 
 
Our findings suggest that it is possible to accept the importance of the emergence of 
new forms of social risk and acknowledge the significance of efforts to develop 
welfare states policies involving a shift of opportunities and decision making on to 
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individuals without accepting the “death of social class” thesis.21 A more fruitful 
approach would be to consider the manner in which new and old social risks interact, 
as in the case of social class and the life cycle,22 thus providing us with a further 
opportunity to answer the question posed by Atkinson (2007a: 360) of the extent to 
which the ‘slayers’ of class are themselves ‘riddled with class processes’. 
 
Appendix A: Measuring Current Life-Style Deprivations (CLSD) 
 
The items included in the scale cover a range of what we term Current Life-Style 
Deprivations (CLSD). In each case we attempt to capture enforced absence of widely 
desired items.  
 
Respondents were asked about some items in the format employed by Mack and 
Lansley (1985): for each household it was established if the item was 
possessed/availed of, and if not a follow-up question asked if this was due to inability 
to afford the item. The following six items took this form: 
• A car or van. 
• A colour TV. 
• A video recorder. 
• A microwave. 
• A dishwasher. 
• A telephone. 
 
A household was considered to be deprived only if absence is stated to be due to lack 
of resources. 
 
For some items the absence and affordability elements were incorporated in one 
question, as follows: “There are some things many people cannot afford even if they 
would like them. Can I just check whether your household can afford these if you 
want them”. The following six items were administered in this fashion: 
• Keeping your home adequately warm. 
                                                     
21 For a detailed discussion of the distinction between new and old social risks see Esping Andersen et 
al (2002) and Taylor-Gooby (2004). 
22 For a detailed discussion of such approaches see Dewilde (2003) 
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• Paying for a week’s annual holiday away from home. 
• Replacing any worn-out furniture. 
• Buying new, rather than second hand clothes. 
• Eating meat, chicken or fish every second day, if you wanted to. 
• Having friends or family for a drink or meal at least once a month. 
 
The final item relates to arrears; we consider a household as experiencing deprivation 
if it was unable to pay scheduled mortgage payments, utility bills or hire purchase 
instalments during the past twelve months. 
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